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Peter Graham’s primary research and teaching areas are epistemology, social epistemology, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of biology, philosophy of social science, and philosophy of language and linguistics. He is perhaps best known for his work on the epistemology of testimony and his work advancing a teleological, proper function process reliabilist account of epistemic warrant in terms of the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function.


Testimony as Speech Act, Testimony as Source

What is Testimony? (1997)

Testimony as Speech Act, Testimony as Source (2015)

Critical Review of Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words (2020)

Typing Testimony (2021)

Testimony is not Disjunctive (2022)

Does Testimony Transmit Knowledge?

Conveying Information (2000)

Transferring Knowledge (2000)

Can Testimony Generate Knowledge? (2006)

Testimonial Knowledge: A Unified Account (2016)

Counterexamples to Testimonial Transmission (2019) (With Zach Bachman)

The “Reductionism” versus “Anti-Reductionism” Debate

The Reliability of Testimony (2000)

Metaphysical Libertarianism and the Epistemology of Testimony (2004)

Liberal Fundamentalism and Its Rivals (2006)

Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-Inferential? (2006)

Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension (2010)

Testimony, Trust, and Social Norms (2012)

Review of Paul Faulkner’s Knowledge on Trust (2013)

Formulating Reductionism about Testimonial Warrant and the Challenge from Childhood Testimony (2018)

Social Knowledge and Social Norms (2018)

What’s Wrong With Testimony? Defending the Epistemic Analogy between Testimony and Perception (forthcoming)

Burge on Testimony

Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony: Burge on the A Priori Basis of Testimonial Entitlement (2018)

Testimony and the Scope of the Apriori (2018, in press)

Assertion, Testimony, and Social Norms

Testimony, Trust, and Social Norms (2012)

Epistemic Normativity and Social Norms (2015)

Epistemic Evaluations: Consequences, Costs and Benefits (2015) (With Zach Bachman, Meredith McFadden & Megan Stotts)

Epistemic Norms and the “Epistemic Game” they Regulate: The Basic Structured Epistemic Costs and Benefits (2017) (With David Henderson)

A Refined Account of the “Epistemic Game”: Epistemic Norms, Temptations, and Epistemic Cooperation (2017) (With David Henderson)

The Function of Assertion and Social Norms (2018)

Social Knowledge and Social Norms (2018)

Epistemic Norms as Social Norms (2019) (With David Henderson)

Assertion, Handicaps, and Social Norms (2020)

Critical Review of Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words (2020)

Knowledge is Not Our Norm of Assertion (2024) (With Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen)


Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension (2010)

Does Justification Aim at Truth? (2011)

Psychological Capacity and Positive Epistemic Status (2011)

Perceptual Entitlement and Basic Beliefs (2011)

Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan (2011)

Epistemic Entitlement (2012)

Against Inferential Reliabilism: Making Origins Matter More (2014)

The Function of Perception (2014)

Warrant, Functions, History (2014)

Against Transglobal Reliabilism (2014)

Against Actual-World Reliabilism: Epistemically Correct Procedures and Reliably True Outcomes (2016)

Normal Circumstances Reliabilism: Goldman on Reliability and Justified Belief (2017)

Why is Warrant Normative? (2019)

Why Should Warrant Persist in Demon Worlds? (2020)

Sosa on the New Evil Demon Problem (2023)

Does Knowledge Entail Justification? (2023)

Proper Functionalism and the Organizational Theory of Functions (2023)

The New Evil Demon Problem at 40 (2024)



The Structure of Defeat: Pollock’s Evidentialism, Lackey’s Framework, and Prospects for Reliabilism (2021) (with Jack Lyons)

Theories of Justification

Theorizing Justification (2010)


The Theoretical Diagnosis of Skepticism (2007)

The Relativist Response to Radical Skepticism (2008)

Factivity, Disjunctivism, and Perceptual Knowledge

Dretske & McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge, Conclusive Reasons, and Epistemological Disjunctivism (2020) (With Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen)

Burge (and Wright) on “Entitlement”

What is Epistemic Entitlement? Reliable Competence, Reasons, Inference, Access (2020)

Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement (2020) (With Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen)

Introduction and Overview: Two Entitlement Projects (2020) (With Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen, Zachary Bachman, and Luis Rosa)

History of Epistemology

Russell’s Logical Construction of the External World (2016)


Brandom on Singular Terms (1999)

Defending Millianism (1999)


Gabor Forrai’s Reference, Truth, and Conceptual Schemes (2002)

Lars Bo Gunderson’s Dispositional Theories of Knowledge (2005)

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s Moral Skepticisms (2007)

Paul Faulkner’s Knowledge on Trust (2013)

Miriam Schiefer McCormick’s Believing Against the Evidence (2015)

Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will (2018) (With Andrew Law & Jonah Nagashima)

Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words (2020)